Cartel Attack

Join us as we discuss Jack Devine’s recent USA Today Op-ed on the narcotrafficking threat, where he argues that Washington should collaborate with Mexico to take down the drug cartels. Jack’s opinion is informed by his time as the CIA Chief of the Latin America Division and Head of the Counter Narcotics Center back in the early 1990s- during which time he was even involved in a collaborative effort to take down Pablo Escobar- the so-called “King of Cocaine.” Listen to what Jack thinks should happen next in Mexico, and why drones and intelligence might play an essential role in mitigating this collective security threat. 

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Cartel Attack

Julia

This week, we'll be talking about a subject that we don't often discuss on this program, and that's narcotics and counter-narcotics. The narcotics threat has officially risen to the level of a top national security priority. And when President Trump assumed office back in January, he immediately directed the federal government to revise existing national security encounter narcotics strategies to pursue the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations. Already, we've seen Trump designate certain groups as terrorist organizations. And over the past few months, we've seen the idea of US military action in Mexico being repeatedly floated as a possible way to weaken the cartels south of the border. Of course, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has something to say about this, but she's also an interesting ally in the fight against the cartels. Jack, this week you published an op-ed in USA Today discussing how we might be able to curtail the impact of Mexican drug cartels and offering some advice from some of your previous experience.

Can you tell us a little bit about your background with the drug cartels?

Jack 

Julia, 1990, I was called back from Rome, a lovely position, I would say, to take over the counter-narcotics program. I had no idea what it entailed. I'd heard, because I'd been overseas, that it was a top priority. And so I was in charge of the counter-narcotics center at Langley, and subsequent to that, I was also Chief of Latin American Division. So I was there over a four-year period of time looking closely at the narcotics problem.

Julia

Do intelligence agencies like the CIA resent narcotics assignments like the one that you received?

Jack Devine

It was a really difficult sale in 1980s. It became an issue and the CIA did not want to touch it because it wasn't national state threats. And similarly, the FBI did not want to do it because they were concerned that if you get in the drug business, your own officers get tainted. So they had to create an entirely new agency to deal with it and that's how DEA was formed because the other institutions were reluctant to lean all in. And at the beginning, a number of people were dragooned to go out to DEA. So I would say, however, over the years, with the sophistication of the intelligence and the way you collect it and the importance in our own well-being. Not only we, but the Defense Department and others have all come around that it's an essential part of the intelligence business.

Julia

Jack, can you take us into that time period and place with you? Can you outline what you saw, or where you were based, or what you were working on in the early 90s?

Jack Devine

Well, it was a worldwide program and we had in the center 17 agencies represented. You had both a community role and a CIA role. And it was really fascinating to see all those folks working together. Even inside CIA, was mixing analysts, operators and technical people because a big part of the program is to come up with technical ways to counter narcotics. But there was alot of strain among the different players and the head of the DEA at that time was Judge Bonner and he was pushing a kingpin strategy and our team was pushing what they called linear strategy, basically meant how do you take all the different countries up and down the coast of Latin America, integrate them so they're all working together. And interestingly enough, we were able to work out an arrangement which was very compatible with the DEA. We would go after kingpins and they would also participate in the linear strategy. So the first year I spent a tremendous amount of time building an alliance among the community and getting everybody to agree to a single approach to it, which I think had proved great success, but there were also big changes in the field.

Julia 

And what about your interactions with local law enforcement? I'm thinking here about what was the scene like in Colombia?

Jack Devine

So I think when I mentioned that there were big changes in the field for many, many years, the CIA and many other agencies looked at foreign liaison is something you need a permission to operate in someone else's foreign country. Although some people were declared and some weren't, this is all part of a public record. So when we started to work counter narcotics, was give them as little as they need because you don't want them turning the equipment on it and you can't trust them and so on. So the early days of the counter narcotics program fell into the old way of looking at liaison. There was a real breakthrough in the terrorism world and the narcotics world in nearly the same time frame. And that was, you know, they are really a force multiplier. We're not going be able to go in the drug dens in Colombia, you know, with our Yale shirt on, or the FBI going in with their badge. So you really need foreigners. And the same thing is true with terrorism. You can't go into a terrorist cell. So that force multiplier then required, well, let's give them what they need. Let's give them high quality intelligence and let's give them the technical tools they need.

Julia

Is that how you and the greater team were able to pursue Pablo Escobar, the so-called King of Cocaine?

Jack Devine

Well, there was one more piece to this that was really important. It's as relevant today as it was then. And that is the amount of corruption in drug countries is extraordinary. And it goes deep into the police and sometimes into the military. So it's very hard to find a reliable partner. So this was a real problem in the field. So what happened? They developed small units where people were taken out of the academy just as they're about to graduate or someone would pinpoint to a particular soldier and they would be brought out, trained and compartmented and this allowed us to operate with the operational security needed so it wasn't compromised.

Julia

You're speaking about Colombia.

Jack Devine

Yes, I am.

You had to compartment them and you had to keep them out of the system. And you have to remember there was either the silver or the bullet, as they said in Spanish, which was, hey, we're either going to give you a bribe and you take it we're going to shoot you. And if you're making $50 a month as a cop in those days. I mean, that's a terrible temptation, right? So the corruptibility was universal and you don't have to do anything. In other words, we don't want you as a policeman doing it. Just look the other way. Just don't bother us. So you have to break through that and that is a problem today as well.

Julia

Well, what is different about what was happening in the early 90s in Colombia compared to what's happening today in Mexico with these cartel threats?

Jack Devine

The center of all cocaine was Colombia, right? It was where the cartels were Pablo Escobar versus the Cali cartel, which were the businessmen. And Pablo Escobar was a high time high roller showman with his network, brutal. Of course, Mexico was just a transport area. You know, we had Mexicans who would carry the drugs into the United States but they weren't cartels, they weren't the organization. But when you look back to the 90s, everyone said, you’re never going to be able to destroy Pablo Escobar, and certainly you're never going to be able to destroy the cartels. But through the mechanisms that we talked about earlier, we actually did. Pablo Escobar bit the dust and the Cali cartels were broken up. They were replaced by small operators. They were replaced by such small operators that the cartels grew up, unfortunately, in Mexico.

So you're never done fighting the cartels. You just need to keep pounding away at them. But difference today is the center of gravity has moved to Mexico.

Julia

And can you tell us a little bit about what made your pursuit in Colombia, what made that an effective program? Besides the fact that you mentioned that some of the officers were taken out of the system before they could reach that level of corruption, how did you do it?

Jack Devine

Well, as I said, we never gave liaison anywhere in the world state of the art capabilities. It just didn't happen. But we were giving them the same equipment we were using. And today it's child's play, but it was basically computers where you could do linkages. You found the phone number and you put it in the system and guess what? It hooked up with another and you built a linkage analysis so you could build the whole network out.

You knew where they were. were using computers, but then you were using technical surveillance, airborne platforms to track communications. And so you were really working with liaison in a way that is unprecedented. And I would say it's the same in the terrorism fight. So that was the difference. That's what made it work.

Julia

And how important was this collaboration and the sense of legitimacy of what transpired in Colombia, that it was the Colombians themselves that were at the helm, the face of this operation. How do you see that playing out in Mexico?

Jack Devine

Well, I would submit you can't do the problem. You can't address the problem without the locals. Just not feasible. How are going to go in and arrest somebody? How are you going to attack? It just isn't like that. It's not like an insurgency where you can go in and supply one group of gorillas against another. So today, I think we're looking at the same issues in Mexico. And I would put a great emphasis, and I do in the op-ed, about jointness. You need the Mexicans. You need the boots on the ground.

And who's going to pull the trigger? You should not have Americans pulling the trigger because it's a national sensitivity issue. don't want Americans shooting Mexicans or Colombian citizens. They should do it. But you can provide them with the intelligence and skills and equipment to facilitate that. And that's a real cooperation.

Julia

In this op-ed, Jack, you advocate for the use of drones. Can you share some details here about what you're envisioning and why, in your view, kinetic action against cartel members is necessary?

Jack Devine

We're not making progress. The problem is getting worse. The Mexican cartels are getting deeper into the system. And it's very hard to win it by, we seized 30 kilos, we arrested one guy, we did this, we did that, and it looks good number wise when you stand back, you say, well, yeah, but it was pushed out the other door, you know, and there's another one coming. You need a systemic process that allows you to push back with force. So now you have cartels and the question, we're not bringing them computers. I'm recommending, this is the controversial part of the article, which I'm sure I'm going to get rocks thrown down on me. But I believe we really need to work with the Mexicans, but we need to give them, instead of sending the 82nd Airborne, what I'm suggesting is why don't we use high technology like we're seeing in the Ukraine war and in the Middle East with the latest technologies that would allow you to kinetically attack them. In other words, after you've spotted them in a very strategic way, you would take out their transportation, their leadership using kinetic force. They've been declared terrorists and lethal action could be used against them, particularly in cooperation with the Mexicans. And I submit this isn't a campaign for years, like you're digging them out of every hole. This is not an insurgency. It's money and corruption. So if you start taking them out, they're going to do what they did in Colombia. They're going to go. They're not going to fight. In other words, they're using drones now, the cartels there, but they're more for surveillance and so on. You put state of the art and you match it up with intelligence and all other facilities.

I promise you, and if you keep it from leaking, and that's why its compartmentation is so important, I don't think it'll be very long before they're moving. And you say, well, too bad, we're in a poor country that gets it. Then you go after them there, but you keep them on the run. But right now, it's a real cancer on our border, and it's a real cancer in one of our strongest allies. Mexico is powerfully important to us, and it's a neighbor. If we can help them, knock them out, we help ourselves as well.

Julia

I think that there's a lot of fear in terms of using weapons in Mexico, both in terms of how effective it would be and risks, of course, of civilian casualties…

Jack Devine

There should be no civilian casualties. Why? You have very disciplined rules. You only fire when it is unquestionably the traffickers. You don't hit them in the middle of a marketplace or a hospital. You'll know they're going down the road. Look at the footage out of Ukraine if your stomach can handle it. And watch what happens to a carload of Russian troops when you see the drone come right in the back of their truck. So I think there's a way to get civilians down to zero with great oversight.

Julia

And how effective do you think this kind of targeted killing will be? You mentioned that might have the cartels on the run. What is the best case scenario at this point, Jack? What's going to happen to the cartels if what you envision plays out in Mexico?

Jack Devine

I think modern weaponry, drones, it’s changed warfare. It hasn't just changed Ukraine. It's changed the way we're going to fight. Now, these are real enemies. now consider these drug folks are as bad as any terrorists. They're killing our people. So we have now decided the nation that were designated terrorists, the Mexicans, it's eating into their system deeply. You have to destroy them. And that's warfare- it's the same as with the terrorists. You have to look at them as the way we define them, as terrorism. And once you start to do what the Ukrainians are doing to the Russians on the battlefield, these folks do not have the Ukrainian guts. They're not going to stay there and fight. They don't have a national cause. They're moving their business. Probably go to Venezuela, a country I've known and have great appreciation for. But, you know, so they're going to go there. It's going to take them a while. It's going to be more expensive.

And you have to think of the Fentanyl that's pouring into Mexico and it's so easy to get it from Mexico and the United States. So to me, I think it has to be part of a general strategy. And that strategy is we have to have a national directive around it. We have to have centers built. We have to have joint teams. And then we apply battlefield techniques to it. Probably handled by the Mexican military is the first logical place I would look but the Mexican government has to agree that this is a play. I would say it's far superior than us doing it unilaterally. I don't know how unilaterally works with all deference to everybody. I understand the heartfelt reason to do it, but you're gonna be much more effective if you do it together with the Mexicans.

Julia

Agreed, Jack. Just to wrap it up, I'm still not quite following how we compare cartel members that are Mexican citizens in Mexico walking around doing their thing, how we could compare that to a Russian soldier on Ukrainian land, because I imagine there's got to be some sort rule of law, right? Like how we know that we're getting the right people, what kind of trials are expected to take place, what's the process like for that?

Jack Devine

I know that you're having a real struggle with me on this, okay? And I worked on you for some time on this issue. And my view is, tell me the alternative. And the alternative is, well, let's just let it get worse, and then it will get so bad, they’ll die. But my point is, you have to stop it. And if someone has a better alternative than taking them out I haven't heard it. If you're going to do, well, let's do it the way we did it for the past 25 years. We're going to ad hoc it. We're going to arrest somebody here. Not going to work. So drastic situation requires drastic means. It has to have the full support for the United States Congress. They're going to support it. The laws, country. We adhere to the sovereignty of Mexico.

We work with them to develop a strategy. They have to sell to their own people. 95% of the Mexicans will want to get rid of the cartel. They're a nuisance in their lives. Nuisance isn't the right word. Mexicans die from drugs. Now it was in the past they didn't use them. So we really have to get tough with cartels, and we have to get tough diplomatically, politically, economically and strategically with the Mexicans.

Julia

Thanks so much for your take on this, Jack.

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